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Over the recent years, the ship traffic in the polar areas has increased. There is reason to 
believe that this traffic, and especially the cruise traffic, will increase further as the ice retracts 
towards the poles. There is also reason to believe that with the continued focus and exposure 
of the Polar Region, the cruise tourism to the region will grow. 
The increased presence in the polar areas will create positive repercussions for several actors, 
both on sea and land. There will however also be negative consequences associated with the 
growing presence in the polar areas. Vessels will be operating with long distance to other 
vessels and land infrastructures. These vessels will also be operating in climate and conditions 
that will put extra pressure on both vessel and crew. These challenges need to be solved in 
order for the ship industry to operate safely in the Polar Region. 
To ensure that companies operating in these areas identifies and manages these challenges, 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed the Polar Code with the intent of 
increasing the safety for vessels operating in polar waters, and to reduce the impact on 
humans and environment in the remote, vulnerable and potential harsh area. This code defines 
a number of requirements that the vessels should operate in accordance with.  
The aim for this thesis is to reveal what challenges the vessel and its crew need to deal with 
when navigating in polar waters. The challenges will be analysed and assessed through the 
use of a preliminary risk analysis. The goal with this part of the thesis is to determine the 
potential hazards the vessel is exposed to under operations in polar waters, and to find out 
what level of risk the different hazards represents for the vessel and its crew. The main goal 
for the thesis is to find out how the risk levels can be reduced, with particular focus on the use 
of simulator training as a risk reducing measure. The final goal is to measure the risk towards 
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Chapter 2 in the Polar Code states that a vessel is to prepare an operation manual for polar 
waters. In this manual, risk should be detected and assessed for every situation the vessel is 
intended to operate in. When assessing the risk, there are mainly two factors involved, 
probability and consequence. Due to little statistical data available, it is of high interest to 
collect estimated data for probability and consequences for different situations through 
simulator exercises. The main goal with this thesis is to identify what kind of situations that 
can be assessed through the use of simulator exercises, and establish which situations have to 
be assessed using other measures. The thesis will also investigate if simulator exercises in 
general is useful for this kind of risk assessment, or if other techniques should be used. The 
first step in this process is to detect which hazards the vessel will be exposed to under the 
different operations it is intended to execute. These hazards can be a challenge itself to reveal, 
and will vary from vessel to vessel and operation to operation. Simulator exercises can be a 
useful aid also for detecting situations which can pose a threat to the vessel and/or its crew. In 
this thesis, the focus will be on assessing general hazards that can expose the vessel to 
enhanced risk. Which hazards to assess will be chosen by investigating statistical data, 
literature and by conversation with experts on the field and navigators with experience from 












The work related to this thesis can be composed into three different parts, where different 
methods have been used. In this chapter, the different methods will be briefly discussed. 
1.1 Background information and theory 
The first part of the work related to this thesis consist of gathering background information 
for the risk analysis. In order to perform a HAZID (Hazard Identification) for navigation in 
polar waters, it is necessary to have knowledge regarding all aspects of the navigational 
process. Including knowledge not just regarding operation and navigation under polar 
conditions, but also thorough knowledge regarding systems and equipment vital for the 
navigational process. Much of this knowledge has been accumulated through a bachelor-
degree in Nautical science, but it will still be necessary to do a comprehensive literature study 
in order to collect the needed background information. The literature study will be 
supplemented by information gathered through conversation with navigators with experience 
from operations in polar waters.  
It is also necessary to gather information regarding the possibilities within simulation of polar 
operating conditions. There are not much literature available on this field. The relevant 
knowledge and theory for this matter has to be accumulated through the solid research 
community on this field that exist at the Arctic University of Norway here in Tromsø. 
1.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
After the background information and theory is at a sufficient level, the next step is to 
perform a preliminary hazard analysis for navigation in polar waters. Preliminary hazard 
analysis is a technique to identify possible hazards for a system or a process. The principle for 
the analysis is to identify hazards that could lead to accidents. The aim is to find eventual 
weaknesses for the system or process before they occur, and then implement corrective 
measures as a proactive risk management. 
The aim with this part is to find out if simulator training can reduce the risk when navigating 
in polar waters, and for which kind of hazardous situations simulator training could have a 
risk-reducing effect. It is necessary to perform a full preliminary hazard analysis in order to 
find out how useful simulator training is compared to other risk-reducing measures. For some 
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situations, regular risk-reducing measures such as duplication of equipment etc. could have 
larger impact on the risk-reduction.  
1.3 Testing of simulator environment         
After the literature study, it should be possible to determine the conditions that increases the 
risk when operating in polar areas. The next step is to investigate how these conditions can be 
simulated in the most realistic way. This will be done by manual testing of each condition, to 
see how the different available environmental factors works and interacts with one another. 
The primary focus for this part will be on failure and inaccuracy for equipment, weather 
conditions and ice conditions. Other factors will be considered if found to be significant 
through the preliminary hazard analysis.   





2 Challenges related to navigation in the Arctic 
Navigation in the Arctic is challenging. The vessel and crew are exposed to a harsh climate that affects 
the performance both for humans and equipment. In this chapter, the different challenges that impacts 
navigation in the Arctic are discussed. 
2.1 Positioning, navigation and vital equipment 
The main goals for the navigational officers is to position the vessel, and to navigate the 
vessel safely from destination to destination. This can be a challenging task under normal 
conditions, and even more challenging under polar conditions. In this section, general 
challenges regarding positioning and navigation on high latitudes is discussed. The theory in 
this chapter is mainly collected from a textbook for navigational instruments written by 
Norvald Kjerstad (Kjerstad, Elektroniske og akustiske navigasjonssystemer for maritime 
studier, 2015). Some of the theory is also based on lecture notes from different subjects 
regarding navigational instruments at UiT. 
2.1.1 Positioning by satellite systems 
Several satellite positioning systems are available for positioning of the vessel, such as GPS, 
GLONASS, GALILEO, BEIDOU etc. All these systems have different strengths and 
weaknesses, but the thing they have in common is reduced accuracy at high latitudes. The 
reduction in accuracy is not significant for regular positioning of the vessel. Even at the 
North-Pole, the satellite-geometry will be sufficient for determining the vessels position by 
the use of GPS. If two or more different positioning systems is combined, the vessel is well 
suited for positioning with good accuracy. A sketch showing the orbit for a GPS-satellite is 




Figure 1 Orbit for GPS-satellite. From Novatel. (2018, May 26). An introduction to GNSS. GPS, GLONASS, 
BeiDou, Galileo and other global navigation satellite systems, (https://www.novatel.com/an-introduction-to-
gnss/chapter-3-satellite-systems/gps/) 
The reduced accuracy can be a challenge when performing operations with high demands to 
precision such as DP-operations. Today the number of high-precision operations executed on 
high latitudes is limited, but with future exploitation and extraction of oil and gas on high 
latitudes, DP-operations will be a significant part of both the search, drill, and extraction 
phase. When a high level of accuracy is required, it is normal to improve the position from the 
satellite system with the help of differential techniques, so called differential corrections. This 
correction is based on distance measurement to ground-stations with known position. In polar 
areas the amount of ground-stations is limited, so the nearest ground-station can be far away, 
leading to inaccuracy for the correction. In extreme situations, the inaccuracy of the 
correction from the differential system can lead to a greater inaccuracy of the position. It is 
therefore necessary to use differential corrections on high latitudes with a high level of 
caution. Another challenge is that the corrected signal from the ground-station is transferred 
through communication-satellites, with a limited coverage over the polar areas. 
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2.1.2 Gyro Compass 
The gyro compass is the main method for determination of the vessels true course. The gyro 
compass uses a gyroscope, a wheel that is spinning at high speed and installed in such a way 
that that it can rotate in every direction. The wheel will then have three degrees of freedom 
around the angular-axis, the horizontal axis and the vertical axis. When a gyroscope is 
rotating at high speed a large angular momentum will be induced. This will lead to the 
angular-axis pointing towards a fixed point in space if the movement is undisturbed by no 
external moment of force. The axis will move related to the earth as the planet is rotating. If 
the gyroscope initially is placed in direction east-west, the elevation ratio of the angular-axis 
is 15 degrees per hour. If the gyroscope is placed on equator, a special situation occurs where 
the axis would remain stable and point towards north. If the gyroscope is moved towards 
north, the angular-axis will be exposed to tilt and drift towards east as a consequence of the 
earth rotating. Tilt and drift is depending on the latitude (l) and the horizontal angel between 
the angular-axis and the meridian (a). From this, the expressions for tilt and drift is derived: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 15°cos(𝑇𝑇)sin(𝑎𝑎) (Measured in degrees per hour) 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 = 15°sin(𝑇𝑇) (Measured in degrees per hour) 
This shows that the drift is increasing with latitude, which is a key factor when discussing the 
use of gyro compass on high latitudes.  
The gyroscope is made north-seeking by a precession-force induced by gravity. By making 
the gyroscope top-heavy or bottom-heavy, the gravity-force will press the side of the 
gyroscope with added weight towards the centre of the earth. The induced precession-force 
leads to the angular-axis pointing towards north. The problem is that this movement will be 
un-dampened, leading to the angular-axis oscillating around the meridian. This movement 
needs to be dampened in order to make a useful compass. This dampening is executed 
different for top-heavy and for bottom-heavy gyroscopes. On top-heavy gyroscopes, the 
movement is dampened by the use of an unsymmetrical weight on the vertical axis. This will 
lead to a precession-force which will dampen the oscillations. The problem with this method 
is that it induces a constant error for the system, which is dependent on latitude and the 
dampening-factor for the system. Bottom-heavy gyroscopes use oil-dampening which 
dampens the horizontal oscillations. This type of compasses will have a dampening-error such 
as the top-heavy compasses, but the error will not be dependent of latitude. This difference 
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should be considered when deciding which type of gyro-compass to install on vessels 
intended to operate on high latitudes.  
In addition to the dampening-error described, all gyro-compasses will have a speed-/latitude-
error as a consequence of the vessels speed in relation to the rotation of the earth. The error is 
depending on vessel speed, vessel course and latitude. This error can be derived 
mathematically, and after some simplifications and assumptions the error can be described 
mathematically as: 
Speed-/latitude-error ≈ (0.0635vcos(k)/cos(l), where v = Vessel speed, k = Vessel course and 
l = latitude. 
This expression shows that the error will increase if the latitude or speed increases. The error 
will also increase when steering courses towards north or south. This error is mostly limited 
to a few degrees, but can be much larger if a vessel is sailing at high speed at a high latitude. 
If the vessel also is steering a northerly or southerly course the error can be quite significant, 
as the following example indicates. 




Speed: 20 knots 
Error = (0.0635*20*cos(0))/cos(81) = 8.120 
This example shows how significant the speed-/latitude-error can be under certain 
circumstances. This error needs to be compensated for in order to navigate safely. This can be 
done manually as shown in the example above, or for some compasses by the use of 
standardized tables where latitude, course and speed is used as input. Such a table from 
Anschutz, one of the main suppliers of such equipment, is shown in figure 2. The error can 
for some compasses be automatically compensated for by adjustments on the gyro-compass. 
If using this application on high latitudes, it is important to remember the fact that error or 




Figure 2 Anschutz Table of corrections for gyro compass. From Kjerstad, N. (2015). Elektroniske og akustiske 
navigasjonssystemer (Vol. 5), Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 
Optical gyro-compasses 
In the 1960s the development of optical gyrocompasses started. These special types of 
gyrocompasses are based on the technique of measurement of angular acceleration through 
the use of laser-light. Today, it is mainly to types of optical compasses that is used: 
• Fibre-optic gyro  
• Ring laser gyro 
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The main advantages for this type of compass is the reduced amount of error sources 
compared to the classical types of gyro-compasses. The optical compass will not have any 
errors induced by tilt and/or drift, and no error induced by the vessel speed. The optic 
compass will have a latitude-dependent error, but it will be significantly reduced compared to 
the classic gyro-compass. Other advantages are no maintenance and high reliability due to the 
lack of moving parts, short start-up time and the possibility of acceleration-measurements, 
meaning that the compass is able to measure vessel-movements such as pitch, heave, roll etc. 
The main disadvantage, along with the fact that the optical compass is dependent of an 
external power supply, is the high cost. An optical compass is expensive, and as result of this, 
the compass is mainly used for military purposes. 
2.1.3 Magnetic Compass 
The magnetic compass is the first compass-type developed for navigation. The principle is the 
same as used for finding direction on land. The main advantage for the magnetic compass is 
that it is not dependent of an external or internal power source, the compass is able to find 
magnetically north without the use of electricity. Because of this, the magnetic compass is 
often used as a redundancy for the gyro-compass. Even though most of the navigational 
operations is executed by the use of gyro-compasses, IMO requires cargo vessels over 150 
tonnes and all passenger vessels to be equipped with an authorized magnetic compass. For 
Norwegian vessels, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate can allow vessels with two 
authorized and independent gyro-compasses, which is connected to an emergency power 
supply, to be exempted from the requirements. 
The main disadvantage for the magnetic compass is that it is burdened with more sources of 
error than the gyro-compass, and larger errors. It is mainly to types of errors that affects the 
accuracy for magnetic compasses. The first one is magnetic variation, which is caused by the 
magnetic poles not being at the same location as the geographic poles. The magnetic compass 
will point towards magnetic north, not true north. This magnetic variation will vary from 
place to place, and it will also vary with time as the position of the magnetic poles is 
constantly changing. This means that magnetic variation is a difficult error to compensate for, 
as the compensation factor has to be constantly updated.  
The other error present for the magnetic-compass is deviation. Deviation is a measure of the 
internal magnetism for the vessel. This magnetism will affect the magnetic-compass and lead 
to the compass-needle not pointing towards the magnetic north. The magnetic deviation is 
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divided into two types of internal magnetism, solid magnetism and fleeting magnetism. The 
fleeting magnetism will vary as the vessel moves inside the magnetic field of the earth. The 
solid magnetism is induced during building of the vessel, or if the vessel is sat not moving for 
a longer period of time. To avoid this type of magnetism becoming too significant, it is 
normal to turn the vessel 1800 during the building process. As for the magnetic variation, also 
the deviation will vary with both position and time. Long lay-ups at the shipyard and smaller 
or larger rebuilding of the vessel will affect the deviation. This means that the compensation 
factor also for deviation has to be constantly updated.  
If the magnetic compass is to be used as a source for heading information, it is necessary to 
have updated information regarding both variation and deviation. Information regarding 
variation is found in special charts that is made for displaying magnetic information. In order 
to have updated information regarding deviation, the vessel is to perform a deviation-test 
when newly-built, or if it is reason to believe that the deviation has changed. After the test, it 
is possible to calibrate the compass by the use of external magnets that work against the 
deviation.  
2.1.4 ECDIS 
ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System) is a system for presentation of 
chart- and voyage-data. For a system to be classified as an ECDIS, it has to meet the 
requirements defined by IMO. The main requirements for classification as ECDIS is related to 
back-up systems and power-supply. IMO has implemented a performance standard (IMO Res. 
A 232 (82)) where the basic functionality for ECDIS is described: 
• ECDIS should contribute to safer navigation. 
• With licensed back-up systems, ECDIS should be able to replace the use of paper-
charts. 
• ECDIS should be able to show all information from the chart-data that is relevant for 
safe and efficient navigation. 
• ECDIS should easily be able to update ENC (Electronic Navigational Chart). 
• ECDIS should reduce the work-load for the navigator and give him/her the 
opportunity to plan and monitor the voyage.  




• ECDIS should give an alarm if the system has a failure or in given situations as shown 
in table 1 below: 
Table 1 ECDIS Alarm status (IMO Res. A 232 (82)) 
Information: Alarm Status: 
Large scale Alarm or indication 
Off route (Off-track limit) Alarm 
Crossing of safety-contour (Depth etc.) Alarm 
Caution area Alarm or indication 
Deviation from planned route Alarm 
Arrival at “Critical Point” Alarm 
Different datum (Chart and system) Alarm 
System failure Alarm or indication 
Over-scaling of information Indication 
ENC with larger scale available Indication 
Different navigational systems Indication 
Voyage-plan over safety-contour Indication 
Voyage-plan over caution area Indication 
Failure for positioning system Indication 
Failure for system-test  Indication 
 
Regarding the instruments that is to be connected to the ECDIS-system, IMO requires that 
equipment that provides information regarding position, speed and heading are connected. 
This is normally done through the connection of a satellite positioning system and a gyro-
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compass. Radar- and ARPA-information is also often connected to the ECDIS. In addition to 
the instruments and features that is required as ECDIS-input, a number of other functions is 
available depending on manufacturer. Some of the functions are listed below, although the list 
is just a sample as new functions is released at high speed (Kjerstad, Elektroniske og 
akustiske navigasjonssystemer for maritime studier, 2015) 
• Calculation of tidal-water 
• Information from echo-sounder 
• Harbour information 
• Calculation of current 
• Implementation of weather-charts 
• Track-steering with autopilot 
• Trial-manoeuvre 
• Logbook 
• Magnetic deviation 
• Search and Rescue 
• Astronomical observation with almanac-function 
• Fuel consumption 
• Implementation of GIS (Geographic Information System) 
• Anemometer (Wind measurement) 
• Sonar 
• Dynamic Positioning 
• Printer-function 
• Communication system 
• NAVTEX 
• Position transponders 
• Voyage Data Recorder 
2.1.5 RADAR 
RADAR (Radio Detection And Ranging/Radio Direction And Ranging) is an aid for 
detection of targets that is impossible to see visually, and by the use of ARPA (Automatic 
Radar Plotting Aid) calculate direction and range to targets. The physical principle of a 
RADAR is quite simple. An electromagnetic pulse is sent out from a transmitter. If the pulse 
hits an object, it is reflected back in the opposite direction. The reflected signal is then 
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received by the radar-receiver. The time between transmitting and receiving of the signal is 
measured, and from this the range is calculated. The signal used for detection by radar can 
have different frequencies. It is mainly two types of frequencies used for maritime radars 
(Kjerstad, Elektroniske og akustiske navigasjonssystemer for maritime studier, 2015): 
• S-band (10 cm) has low frequency (2000-4000 MHz). This leads to high detection 
range and little disturbance from rain and/or snow. The main disadvantages are 
increased possibility of missing small targets and increased antenna-size. 
• X-band (3 cm) is the most used type of maritime radar. X-band radars has good reach 
and very good resolution. This leads to increased detection-possibility for small 
targets compared to the S-band radar. The main disadvantage is large influence by 
meteorological conditions such as rain and snow.    
IMO has defined some requirements for the radar equipment in different resolutions over the 
years. A brief summary of the operational and technical requirements is given below (IMO, 
2004): 
Operational requirements: 
• If the antenna is placed 15 m above sea-level, the radar should be able to detect a 60 m 
high shoreline at a range of 20 nm, and a 6 m high shoreline at a range of 8 nm.  
• The radar should also be able to detect a vessel of 5000 tonnes at a range of 11 nm, 
and a 10 m long vessel at a range of 3.4 nm for X-band and 3.0 nm for S-band. 
• The radar should be able to detect an object with a radar cross-section area of 10 m2 at 
a range of 2.5 nm.  
Technical requirements: 
• The antenna should be able to operate in a relative wind speed of 100 kts and rotate 
clockwise with a speed of min 12 rpm.  
• The bearing accuracy should be min 2.50. 
• The minimum detection range should be min 50 m, and the differentiation threshold 
for range should be min 50 m for scales lower than 2 nm.  
• For vessels with a displacement above 500 tonnes, a performance monitor is required. 





ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid) is a tool that calculates the movement for the own-
ship and targets. Based on these calculations, a vector is presented for each vessel that 
indicates the movement for the vessel in the near future (0-30 min). The movement is 
calculated from the change in position between two subsequent radar-sweeps. Based on the 
information from the ARPA-system, the navigator can anticipate how to clear traffic in 
accordance with the nautical rules of the road.  
2.1.6 Communications 
In 1992, IMO introduced the GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System). The 
main goal with the GMDSS is that every vessel in all waters should be able to communicate 
with coastal services and other vessels. Vessels in distress should be able to automatically 
alarm land stations. In order to achieve this goal, IMO has divided the sea-areas into four 
zones with different requirements for the vessels operating in the zones: 
• A1 - Sea-areas that are within radiotelephone-coverage of at least one VHF coastal 
radio-station. 
• A2 - Sea-areas that are within radiotelephone-coverage of at least one MF coastal 
radio-station. 
• A3 – Sea-areas outside A1 and A2 that are within the coverage of Inmarsat 
geostationary satellite-system.  
• A4 – All sea-areas outside A1, A2, A3.  
This thesis will focus on the polar areas, which will be an A4-area in the GMDSS. Below, the 




Figure 3 GMDSS Equipment Requirements. From Cult of sea. (2018, May 26). GMDSS Radio Equipment 
Requirements on Ship as per SOLAS, (https://www.cultofsea.com/gmdss/gmdss-radio-equipment-requirements-
on-ship-as-per-solas/) 
2.2 Environmental conditions 
Vessels operating in the Polar Region is exposed to harsh climate conditions which can 
significantly affect the operation of the vessel. These conditions can affect not only the vessel 
itself, but also affect subsystems that are vital for operating the vessel. In this chapter the most 
influent environmental parameters for operation of the vessel will be discussed.   
2.2.1 Icing 
Icing is the main environmental concern when operating in cold temperatures. An example of 
severe icing is shown in figure 4. Marine icing on hull and superstructure is the type of icing 
that is most often discussed, but in this thesis the focus will be on marine and atmospheric 
 
Page 16 
icing on vital equipment and subsystems. The reason for this is that marine icing on hull and 
superstructure is a wide-ranging and complex field that requires a lot of data and resources to 
discuss in detail. Marine icing is also mainly a problem for smaller vessels such as fishing 
vessels, and most vessels certified in accordance with the Polar Code is of relative large size. 
The Polar Code also requires heating arrangements for vessels operating in cold temperature, 
reducing the marine icing to a minimum.  
 
Figure 4 Severe icing. From Groupocean. (2018, May 26). De-icing a cargo-boat. 
(https://www.groupocean.com/en/achievements/view/21) 
Icing on antennas could reduce the reach for the radio signals dramatically. This can be solved 
through electric heating of the antenna, although this can lead to other difficulties as the 
antennas are sensitive electronic equipment that can be disturbed when exposed for 
electromagnetic radiation. Another aspect when discussing problems related to antennas is the 
quality of the insulation on the antenna-cables, and especially the connection between the 
antenna and the cable. If the ice accumulated on the antennas melts, the risk of water entering 
the cable increases if the insulation is damaged. Water entering the cables could significantly 
reduce the signal-strength, and could in a worst case scenario lead to the equipment connected 
the antenna being useless. 
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2.2.2 Power Source Capacity 
IMO has through the SOLAS-convention stated some requirements for the vessels 
redundancy power source. An example from SOLAS-requirements regarding capacity for 
redundancy power source is shown below: 
The redundancy power source should be able to operate the radio installation for: 
• One hour for vessels equipped with an authorized emergency power supply for 
operating the radio installation for at least 18 hours for cargo vessels and 18 hours for 
passenger vessels. 
• Six hours for vessels which are not equipped with an authorized emergency power 
supply. 
It is worth mentioning that the capacity for lead-acid accumulators normally is calculated 
from a discharge time of 20 hours and an operational temperature of 20OC. This means that it 
can be necessary to enhance the capacity for the redundancy power source in order to meet 
the SOLAS-requirements if operating in low temperatures.   
2.3 Human error 
It is impossible to discuss risk regarding maritime operations without mentioning human 
factors. The technology has improved drastically as the years has gone by, but the occurrence 
of accidents are still high. The reason for this is the human factor that is a vital part of nearly 
all maritime operations. In fact, about 75-96% of maritime casualties are caused, at least in by 
some form of human error (Rothblaum, et al., 2002). An illustration of top causes for liability 
loss in insurance cases is shown in figure 5. This shows that human error is an important 
factor when the aim is to reduce the risk of accidents.  The question is if human error is as 
significant when it comes to operations in polar conditions. It is obvious that polar conditions 
has an impact on materialistic factors and equipment reliability, but does it also have an effect 
on the risk of human error? The answer is yes. The human being is affected by climatic and 
environmental factors just like the vessel itself and equipment. In addition to the physical 
influence, humans has a psychological influence that the vessel and equipment does not have. 
This means that the human is more affected by polar operating conditions than the other 




Figure 5 Top causes of liability loss. From Ship Management International. (2018, May 26). Human error blamed 
for 75% of marine liability losses. (http://shipmanagementinternational.com/human-error-blamed-for-75-of-marine-
liability-losses/) 
The statement that the risk of human error is affected by polar operation conditions is further 
strengthened by the findings in the report “Causal analysis of groundings and collision in 
Norwegian waters” from Kystverket (DNV GL, 2014). The reports states that the region 
where the largest part of the accidents is found to be caused by human error is Troms and 
Finnmark. Even though Troms and Finnmark not is included in the Arctic by the definition 
from the Polar Code, it is safe to say that vessels operating in this area is experiencing polar 
operating conditions during winter time. In other definitions of the Arctic, Troms and 
Finnmark is included, e.g. by the use of the Arctic Circle as the definition of the Arctic. 
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To find the risk of human error is a very challenging task. Human error is a complex field 
with many factors contributing to the risk of error. The risk is strongly dependent on factors 
such as experience, physical and psychological medical condition, attitude of crew etc. There 
are also different background factors that could lead to human error. For this thesis, only the 
factors that are influenced by polar operating conditions is discussed and analysed in the 
preliminary hazard analysis. How the factors are influenced by polar operating conditions is 
discussed in chapter 4.2. 
2.3.1 Fatigue 
Fatigue is defined as “extreme tiredness resulting from mental or physical exertion or illness.” 
In the maritime industry, fatigue is mainly used for tiredness caused by long working hours 
combined with lack of sleep. Fatigue is a very common condition to experience, at least at 
some level. Fatigue is found to be the “number one” concern of mariners in two different 
studies (Marine Transportation Research Board; 1976; National Research Council, 1990), 
(Rothblaum, et al., 2002). 
2.3.2 Complacency 
Complacency is defined as “a feeling of smug or uncritical satisfaction with oneself or one's 
achievements.” Complacency is most often developed when the navigator has gained some 
experience and is comfortable when performing the work tasks. The risk of complacency 
increases if the working-days are alike and contains little action. The risk of complacency is 
reduced by the use of attitude forming of the personnel and implementation of a well-working 
reporting culture.  
2.3.3 Inadequate general technical knowledge 
Over the years, the available amount of equipment for the navigator has increased 
dramatically. Earlier the navigator relied on a paper-chart, a compass and maybe a radar. 
Today, the navigator has a number of sources to gather information from. Many of these 
sources is connected to complex systems such as ECDIS. Many navigators does not 
understand how these systems are working, and which sources of information is being used at 
which time. This can lead to incorrect use of equipment, or that the navigators choose not to 
use a source of information due to lack of knowledge. In one study, (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 
1987), inadequate technical knowledge was responsible for 35% of the casualties (Rothblaum, 
et al., 2002). 
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2.3.4 Poor equipment design 
A vessel fully equipped for operations in polar areas has a lot of equipment which is not 
present at a vessel operating under normal conditions. On the bridge, extra equipment such as 
ice-radars, infra-red cameras, controls for extra search-lights etc. is often installed. This 
equipment has to be placed in accordance with the other standard-equipment on the bridge. 
This often represents problems whether the extra equipment is installed after the vessel is 
built, or when building the vessel, as the issue of bridge ergonomics and where to install 
different equipments is well known. For operations in polar areas it can be necessary to adjust 
standard-equipment to make sure to avoid light-pollution etc. The already mentioned study by 
Wagenaar & Groenweg (Wagenar & Groeneweg, 1987) found that poor equipment design 
was cited as a causal factor in one-third of major marine casualties (Rothblaum, et al., 2002). 
2.3.5 Decisions based on inadequate information    
This type of human error is strongly connected to complacency and inadequate general 
technical knowledge. A complacent navigator will probably rely on the sources that he/she 
normally relies on without making sure that the information is correct or if other sources have 
other or better relevant information that affects the voyage. A navigator with inadequate 
general technical knowledge is probable to rely on information from the sources he/she is 
familiar with. Information from other sources is in danger to be ignored, either because the 
navigator does not understand the information or that he/she does not rely on the information 
because they are unfamiliar with the source of the information.  
2.3.6 Poor judgement   
Poor judgement will happen from time to time, and occasionally the navigators will be 
punished. The risk of poor judgement is strongly connected to all the above-mentioned human 
errors, and an increase in the probability for one or more of them will lead to an increase in 
the risk of poor judgement. Examples of poor judgement can be passing to closely to a 
danger, too high speed under the given conditions, ignoring potential risks etc.  
2.3.7 Faulty standards, policies and practices    
This category of human error is often the underlying cause of many of the above-mentioned 
factors. The safest way is not always the most lucrative way when it comes to making money 
in a short term perspective. In a market where many companies are surviving from day to day 
because of low income and high costs, it is easy to choose solutions that encourages higher 
risk-taking, but also a higher earning. It is also a fact that it can be a problem for companies to 
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have written, precise operational procedures on-board all vessels. To develop such procedures 
requires competence in risk-assessment and HSE-procedures, along with knowledge 
regarding the vessel, its equipment and the procedures to be performed on-board the vessel. 
The crew on the vessel is often lacking competence regarding risk-assessment and 
development of procedures. This leads to the shore-offices often dealing with the risk-
assessment and developing the procedures, with lack of knowledge regarding the vessel and 
the operations being performed. The result is imprecise procedures that are difficult to use for 
the crew when performing operations. Healthy standards, policies and practices must start 
from the top of the company and then be spread down to each vessel. The key to implement 
this in a successful way is attitude forming and upgrading of skills. 
2.4 Navigation in ice 
The theory in this chapter is mainly collected from a textbook in navigation written by 
Norvald Kjerstad (Kjerstad, Fremføring av skip med navigasjonskontroll for maritime studier, 
2013). Some of the theory is also based on lecture notes in different subjects regarding 
navigation at UiT.  
If possible, operations in ice should be avoided, although it can be necessary to pass through 
areas with drift ice or similar. The most important factor to consider when passing through 
such an area is to navigate the vessel as careful as possible to avoid damages to hull and 
machinery. This means that the speed should be adjusted in accordance with the current 
situation, and that icebergs and large ice floes should be avoided. Norvald Kjerstad, one of the 
leading experts in Norway regarding navigation in ice, has written  in one of his textbooks 
regarding navigation that “The fastest way through the ice is seldom the shortest one.” 
(Kjerstad, Fremføring av skip med navigasjonskontroll for maritime studier, 2013). 
Most vessels have regular hulls without ice-strengthening. For those vessels the most relevant 
situation will be navigation in drift ice. If a vessel needs to cross through an area with drift 
ice, there are often some indications that can be used for planning the crossing. An example of 
a very helpful indication is the phenomenon “ice blink”. This is a meteorological 
phenomenon where the ice is reflected onto the sky. For this phenomenon to be present is it 
necessary to have clear weather with a thin cloud cover. In the direction the ice blink is 
observed it will be much ice, and it will be preferable to avoid steering in this direction if 
possible. It is also possible to detect channels or wakes in the ice as dark stripes in the ice 
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blink. Such channels or wakes could be helpful to navigate by if they are leading in the 
headed direction. 
Other indications to be aware of is for instance swells in the ice. If swells are observed, it is 
probable that the ice conditions are lighter in the direction that the swells are coming from. 
Fog with yellow-white colour often indicates waters with ice. Small lumps of ice in the water 
is a certain indication of waters with ice ahead. Another sign indicating the same could be a 
sudden drop in air- and water-temperature.   
It is also possible to detect ice by the use of hearing. Breakers can be heard from a long 
distance. This can be very useful if the visibility is limited, although the noise level from the 
vessel can drown out the sounds from the ice. 
2.4.1 Entering the ice 
When all information regarding the ice and the surrounding environment is collected, the next 
step should be to plan the entering of the area with ice. First, it is necessary to find the best 
possible position for entering the ice. This position is determined based on ice-conditions and 
the intended route further into the ice. It is often necessary to observe the ice-edge for some 
time, both visually and by radar, before deciding where to enter. 
2.4.2 Radar in ice 
The use of a standard maritime radar can be very helpful in the process of detecting ice in 
water, although it is important to keep in mind the limitations for such equipment. It is 
important not to take it for granted that the water is free of ice even though the radar-image 
indicates no sign of ice. The possibility of detection of ice by radar is strongly dependent on 
the ice-conditions. Drift-ice can be difficult to detect, especially if the size of the ice-units is 
small. The same goes if the ice is glassy, meaning that the ice is not granulated. The 
possibility of detection of icebergs is dependent on the angle of gradient for the side of the 
iceberg that is exposed to the radar. This angle can often affect the possibility of detection 
more than parameters like size and range. If the aim is to detect ice at a short range, the best 
possible radar-configuration is a 3-cm radar with long antenna. The pulse-length should be set 
to medium or long. The possibility of detection of drift-ice, growlers etc. is strongly 
dependent on the sea-state and the antenna-height.  
In calm sea, the detection range for different ice-conditions are estimated as shown in table 2: 
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Table  2 Detection range for different ice conditions (Kjerstad, Fremføring av skip med navigasjonskontroll for 
maritime studier, 2013) 
Type of ice: Detection range: 
Large icebergs 15-20 nm 
Large growlers 2 nm 
Belts of scattered drift-ice Difficult to detect even at short range 
Dense belt of drift-ice 5-6 nm 
 
In heavy sea, the possibility of detection of dangerous ice like growlers and belts of dense 
drift-ice would be very low due to echoes from the sea that will induce noise on the radar-
screen. Under these conditions, the navigator would have to rely on other sources of 
information in order to navigate safely. The “Echo trails”-function on the radar can be very 
helpful if the radar-screen is disturbed by noise from the sea. By the use of this function, it 
can be easier to divide echoes from ice and echoes from the sea. The clutter-functions, which 
is a mathematically filter that removes noise, can also be helpful. However, these functions 
should be used with extreme care, as they can easily remove targets that in fact are ice, or 
even worse, another vessel.  
Ice Radar 
Over the years, several special radars for detection and/or classification of ice have been 
introduced. These systems are not found on all vessels operating in ice, mainly as a result of 
high purchase price. The technique behind the ice-radars is the use of Scan Correlation. This 
technique correlates multiple scans that then are put together to a radar image provided for the 
user. This means that the processing can take some time, but the resulting radar image can be 
very informative for detection and classification of ice. An example of a radar-image for an 





Figure 6 Radar image for ice-radar. From Furuno. (2018, May 26). Ice-Radar. 
(http://www.furuno.com/en/merchant/iceradar/) 
2.4.3 Routines for navigation in ice 
When navigating in waters with ice, it can be useful to have routines that lowers the risk of 
collision with dangerous ice. In this chapter, some vital general routines are presented. 
However, each vessel has to implement their own routines for the operations they are 
intended to execute. Some vital routines, derived from a textbook in ice-navigation (Kjerstad, 
Fremføring av skip med navigasjonskontroll for maritime studier, 2013) is presented below:  
• Manoeuvring-system ready for action 
When navigating in waters with ice, it is of high importance that the manoeuvring-
system is ready for immediate action, especially for being able to stop the vessel 
fast if ice is detected in front of the vessel. It is also important to be vigilant when 
it comes to stopping distance when sailing in convoy behind an icebreaker. One of 
the situations that leads to most damage on vessels when navigating in ice is 
collision under convoy-operations. It is important to monitor the distance between 






• Manual steering 
Autopilot should not be used when navigating in ice. It will be necessary to change 
course often due to the ice-conditions. It can also be necessary to use the rudder to 
avoid the vessel getting stuck in the ice. In these situations, the rudder will have to 
be used actively with large rudder deflections. When using autopilot, the rudder 
deflection is limited. It is also recommended to have both pumps on the steering 
engine running for being able to alternate course rapidly. 
 
• Positioning and work in chart 
Normally, it would be necessary to deviate strongly from the intended course in 
the chart due to the ice-conditions. This will lead to difficulties regarding always 
being in control over the vessels position in the chart. When considering the earlier 
mentioned challenges regarding GNSS-signals and the quality of available chart-
information, control of the vessels position should be a high priority. It can be very 
useful to control the vessels position by the use of parallel-indexes if there are 
available land-areas or maritime infrastructure for such methods.   
 
• Communication 
If several vessels are operating together, e.g. in convoy-operations, communication 
should be a high priority. In the International Code of Signals, standardised signals 
for use in convoy-operations is defined. In addition to this code, local regulations 
and procedures regarding communication can exist, usually found in local pilot-
descriptions. 
 
• Lookout  
Lookout by radar and searchlight will reduce the risk of collision with ice. The 
visual lookout should be combined with lookout by radar. If the light-conditions 
makes it possible, night goggles could be used. 
 
• Tactical preparation 
The most important routine is to place the intended route where the ice-conditions 
is least problematic. This means that all earlier mentioned factors such as 
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meteorological warnings, statistics and local meteorological phenomenon should 







3 The Polar Code 
The International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) is a 
mandatory code developed by IMO. The aim for the code is to improve the safety of shipping 
and to mitigate harmful effects of shipping on the environment in the remote, vulnerable and 
potentially harsh polar waters (IMO, 2017).   
3.1 Content and structure 
In this paragraph the structure (chapters) of the code is presented and a brief summary of the 
content for the chapters that involve the navigation process is given. The information in this 
paragraph is derived directly from the code (IMO, 2017), although some parts that does not 
have relevance for the navigational process is left out. 
3.1.1 Chapter 1 General 
In the first chapter information regarding the code and the buildup of the code is explained. 
Definitions that are used later in the code is listed. It is stated which ships the code applies 
for, and that these ships needs a certificate to document that they are constructed, equipped 
and operated in accordance with the code. In the end of the chapter, the code defines what 
they call quality standards, which ensures that the ship and its equipment will be functional 
under the conditions they intend to operate. The ships are also required to execute an 
operational assessment, meaning that the operational circumstances the ship is meant to 
operate under needs to be assessed. Factors to be considered here are among others, but not 
limited to, temperature conditions, ice conditions, operations on high latitudes, and potential 
for having to leave the ship in the ice or at shore.  
Chapter 1 also requires the ship to assess possible dangers to the ship. In the introduction for 
the code, the IMO have given some dangers that is always to be assessed: 
• Ice that can lead to damage to the hull, loss of stability, damage to machinery, 
influence on the navigation, influence on the work environment outdoors, affect 
maintenance and other tasks, and could lead to failure for safety equipment and 
systems. 
• Icing on the superstructure and hull above waterline with subsequent reduction in 
stability and functionality of equipment. 
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• Low temperatures, that effects work environment and human performance, 
maintenance and emergency preparedness, properties of materials and efficiency of 
equipment, survival ability and the performance of safety equipment and systems. 
• Long periods of darkness or daylight, as this can affect both navigation and human 
performance. 
• High latitude, as this affects navigational systems, communication systems and the 
quality of satellite images for information regarding ice conditions. 
• Remote locations, and possible lack of accurate and complete hydrographic data and 
information, reduced availability of navigational aids and seamarks with following 
increased risk of grounding, limited availability of search and rescue services with 
following delay in emergency response, and limited communication ability. 
• Possible lack of experience among the crew regarding operations in polar waters, with 
following potential for human error. 
• Possible lack of suitable emergency equipment, with following potential reduced 
efficiency in mitigation measures. 
• Varying and difficult weather conditions. 
• The environment regarding vulnerability towards harmful substances and other 
damages to the environment, and the need for longer restitution time.  
If the ship identifies further sources that can be a danger to the ship, the code requires the ship 
to assess them in the same manner as the above mentioned.  
3.1.2 Chapter 2 Operation manual for polar waters 
Chapter 2 states that the ship is to prepare an operation manual for polar waters. The aim for 
this manual is to give the company, operator, captain and crew information regarding the 
operational capacities and limitations for the ship. The code defines some aspects the manual 
should consider, such as: 
• Information regarding capacities and limitations for the ship in connection with the 
operational assessments from chapter 1. 
• The manual should include or refer to specific procedures that should be followed in 




• The manual should include or refer to specific procedures that should be followed if 
unwanted events occurs in polar waters. 
• The manual should include or refer to specific procedures that should be followed if 
the ship find itself in a situation which exceeds its capacities or limitations. 
• The manual should include or refer to procedures that should be followed if assistance 
from icebreaker is required.  
To make sure that the ship complies with these requirements, the code has established some 
rules to be followed when operating in polar waters: 
• The manual should be kept onboard the ship. 
• The manual should include the methodology used for determining characteristics and 
limitations in ice. 
• The manual should include risk-based procedures for the following aspects: 
1. Route planning in order to avoid ice and/or temperatures that exceeds the 
construction capabilities or limitations for the ship. 
2. Arrangements to receive warnings regarding the environmental conditions. 
3. Means to handle possible limitations due to the available hydrographic, 
meteorological and navigational information. 
4. Operation of equipment required in other chapters in the code. 
5. Implementation of specific measures for ensuring the functionality of 
equipment and systems under low temperatures, icing on the hull above the 
waterline and occurrence of sea ice, if relevant. 
6. Contact with rescue services related to salvage, search and rescue, oil spill etc., 
if relevant. 
7. For ships with ice strengthening in accordance with chapter 3, procedures for 
maintaining survival equipment and the ships integrity if the ship is stuck in 
the ice for a long period of time. 
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• The manual should include procedures to be followed for measures that need to be 
taken if the ship experiences ice and/or temperatures that exceeds it construction 
capabilities or limitations. 
The manual should include risk-based procedures for monitoring and maintaining the safety 
under operations in ice, including possible requirements for escort operations or icebreaker 
assistance. Different operational limitations can be relevant depending on if the ship operates 
independent or with icebreaker escort. If relevant, the manual should include both 
alternatives. 
3.1.3 Chapter 9 Safe Navigation 
The main goal with chapter 9 in the Polar Code is to ensure safe navigation. To achieve this 
goal, the code establishes some functional requirements for the ship: 
• The ship should be capable of receiving up to date information, including information 
regarding ice, for safe navigation. 
• Navigational equipment and systems should be shaped, constructed and installed for 
remaining functional during the expected environmental conditions in the operation area. 
• Systems for position reference and position determination should be suitable for the 
planned operation areas. 
• The ship should be able to visually detect ice when operating in darkness. 
• Ships involved in operations involving icebreaker escort should have suitable means for 
informing when the ship is stopped. 
For ensuring that these functional requirements are fulfilled, the code establishes some rules 
to be followed: 
Regarding nautical information: 
• The ship should have means for receiving and displaying up to date information regarding 
the ice conditions for the operation area. 
Regarding functionality for navigational equipment: 
• Ships built on the 1. January 2017 or later, which is ice strengthened in accordance with 
chapter 3 in the Polar Code, should be equipped with either two independent echo 
sounders, or one echo sounder with two separate independent transducers. 
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• The ship should operate in accordance with SOLAS rule V/22.1.9.4 (“A clear view 
through at least two of the navigation bridge front windows and, depending on the bridge 
design, an additional number of clear-view windows, shall be provided at all times, 
regardless of weather conditions”), independent of building date, size and, depending on 
the bridge design, clear visibility astern. 
• For ships operating in areas, and in periods, where icing can occur, there should be means 
made available to avoid accumulation of ice on antennas vital for navigation and 
communication. 
• In addition, for ships with ice-strengthened hull in accordance with chapter 3, the 
following applies:  
1. Where equipment required after SOLAS chapter V or this chapter have hull-
mounted sensors, such sensors should be protected against ice. 
2. For ships of category A and B build on the 1. January 2017 or later, the “bridge-
wings” should be covered or shaped to protect navigational equipment and 
personell. 
• Ships should have two non-magnetic means for determining and presenting the vessels 
course. Both means should be independent and should be connected to the ships main- 
and emergency power supplies. 
• Ships intended to operate above the 80 degree of latitude should be equipped with at least 
one GNSS-compass or equivalent, which should be connected to the ships main- and 
emergency power supplies. 
Regarding extra navigational equipment: 
• Ships, with exception for ships only operating in areas with 24 hour daylight, should be 
equipped with two remote-rotatable searchlights with narrow beam which can be 
controlled from the bridge for illuminating the horizon around the ship, or other means for 
visually detection of ice. 
• Ships involved in operations involving icebreaker-escort should be equipped with a 
blinking red light which is started up manually and is visible from astern for informing 
when the ship is stopped. This light should be visible within a distance of at least two 
nautical miles, and the horizontal and vertical visibility-sectors should be in accordance 
with the specifications for aft-lanterns in COLREGS (Regulations for prevention of 






4 Simulator training 
Operation of vessels under polar conditions can be described as a high-risk operation. The 
vessel is exposed to several challenges that makes the process of safe navigation more 
complex. A vessel operating in polar areas is most often of a considerable size and equipped 
for operations in such areas. This means that the vessel represents a valuable asset for the 
owner. Another aspect is that the vessel is carrying human beings on-board, represented by 
crew and potential passengers. If the vessel finds itself in some sort of crisis, it is certain that 
the risk of loss of lives is significant, due to harsh climatic conditions and lack of available 
infrastructure for assistance in emergency situations. 
4.1 Why use simulator training? 
Operation of vessels under polar conditions can be considered a high-risk operation, as 
described earlier. The high level of risk is strongly connected to the high consequences for a 
potential accident. Nearly 80% of all accidents in the maritime sector is related to human 
error. If the risk of human error is reduced, the total risk will be significantly reduced.  
Research shows that training of the crew can be a successful risk-reducing measure.  
Operation of vessels under polar conditions induces increased risk compared to operation of 
vessels under normal conditions. The accessible data available for the crew (weather 
forecasts, chart data, statistical wave data) is limited, the risk of failure and/or inaccuracy for 
mechanical and electrical equipment is increased and the risk of human error is increased. All 
factors due to the challenging operating conditions and complex situations where different 
kind of equipment have to be used at the same time in order to execute the operation safely.  
It is possible to use real life training as a method for improving the competence of the crew, 
as less experienced crewmembers can work alongside more experienced personnel. It is 
however preferable that the crewmembers have some experience before having to deal with 
the situations, considering the high consequences of a possible human error. It is also worth 
mentioning that some of the situations the crewmembers need to have knowledge about 
occurs very rarely. It is possible to operate a vessel for a long time without experiencing loss 
of position from the satellite-positioning systems, for example by the use of a triple-receiver 
that allows the user to take in signals from multiple satellite systems at the same time.  
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Considering the abovementioned aspects, being consequences of a possible failure and 
difficulty in inducing relevant failure modes, it is useful to apply simulator training to 
increase crew competence in execution of polar operations. The crew can train in a safe 
environment where wrong decisions does not have large consequences. The crew can also 
train their reactions to failure modes and emergency situations which they rarely will 
experience in real life, but where fast and correct response is key to a successful solution of 
the problem.  
The maritime industry has not done much research about the results simulator training has on 
the performance for the navigators, but in this chapter some of the literature regarding the 
subject will be analysed.  
4.1.1 The Sleipner A towing operation 
When preparing for towing the Sleipner A(2) platform from the construction site in 
Gandsfjorden, Norway, to the installation site in the North-Sea, a decision was made by the 
project management to train the towing team by the use of simulator training. The project 
management made the assumption that the simulator training would reduce the likelihood of a 
navigating error, and increase the reliability of responding to either a navigation error or a tow 
line error. When deciding how to estimate the magnitude of the performance improvement, 
human error databases and psychological literature were reviewed (Williams, 1988, Swain 
and Guttman, 1983). From this, the project management concluded that the risk could be 
reduced by a factor of 10. This led to a reduction for the probability for total loss of platform 
from 6.3*10-5 for untrained personnel to 3.3*10-7 for trained personnel (Gudmestad, et al., 
1995).  
From the paper “Use of simulator training to reduce to reduce risk in offshore marine 
operations”, the following statements regarding simulator training can be found: 
• “As experienced for previous tows, the simulator training proved to be of great value 
to those who were in charge of manoeuvring the platform. Lots of knowledge and 
confidence were gained during the simulator training.” (Gudmestad, et al., 1995) 
• “Another aspect of simulator training is the fact that the team members are brought 
together. They are working together, discussing various approaches and digging deep 
into and solving problems long before they potentially could become serious.” 
(Gudmestad, et al., 1995) 
 
Page 36 
• “Simulator training is considered to represent an excellent tool in reducing risk in 
complex offshore marine operations.” (Gudmestad, et al., 1995) 
• “The tow out of Sleipner A was very successful as all personnel involved had gained 
confidence in the tow operations and emergency procedures through involvement in 
the simulator training programme.” (Gudmestad, et al., 1995) 
The process of navigating a vessel safely under polar conditions can be described as a 
complex marine operation, and the findings from the Sleipner tow project management is 
thereby transferable to the situation this thesis is focusing on.   
4.1.2 Other studies 
There are not many other studies available that deals with simulator training and its effect on 
the navigators, but one recent article about the subject is “Reducing Risk of Arctic Operations 
with Ice Simulator” written by J. Koponen from Aker Artic Technology Inc., Helsinki, 
Finland. Some of his findings is shown in this subchapter: 
• “During the process of development of the Full Mission Bridge Simulator, I have 
come in to a conclusion that an important part of a successful learning process is the 
ability to train with a high fidelity bridge simulator.” (Koponen, 2015) 
• “The most cost-effective way to improve special skills needed in the Polar waters is to 
include bridge simulator training to the Deck Officers requirements.” (Koponen, 
2015) 
• “The simulator is needed for different reasons: cost, safety, easiness of teaching, 
efficiency in teaching, testing of design and in finding out operational limits.” 
(Koponen, 2015) 
• “In many cases it is not possible to organize training in a real environment, and arctic 
especially should not be the place where real life practicing takes place. Simulator 
enables training of risky and hazardous operations safely and operators insufficient 
skills can’t harm real nature, lives or material.” (Koponen, 2015)  
Although there is a limited amount of literature available regarding use of simulator for 
maritime navigation purposes, it is possible to use literature and research material from the 
aviation industry to discuss the use of simulator training in general. The aviation industry has 
done more research on the use of simulator as a tool for training and education of personnel. It 
is possible to use findings from this research also for the maritime industry as the general 
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findings regarding simulator training are transferable between the different industries. If 
looking into the aviation-industry, some key factors regarding the use of simulator can be 
found in the paper “FLIGHT SIMULATOR AS AN ESSENTIAL DEVICE SUPPORTING 
THE PROCESS OF SHAPING PILOT'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS” written by J. 
Kozuba and A. Bondaruk from the Polish Air Force Academy (Kozuba & Bondaruk, 2014). 
In this work, it is revealed that some of the main benefits of using simulator, that also are 
relevant for maritime navigational training, are: 
• High training effectiveness.  




• “Learning from mistakes” 
High training effectiveness is one of the primary benefits also for maritime navigational 
training. An hour of simulator training can include several different scenarios in different 
geographical locations. This is impossible in real-life training. It is also a fact that the 
instructors will have more capacity for instructing and guiding during simulator exercises 
than in real life situations. If the training takes place on an actual vessel, the instructors will 
often be in charge of the navigation and safety of the vessel as well as the instructor tasks. 
This will lead to the instructors having less capacity available for guiding the participants in 
the training. 
The safety factor is a key factor. It is always a risk connected to training of inexperienced 
personnel. This risk can be completely eliminated if the training is done through simulator 
exercises.  
Availability is connected to the fact that simulator training is independent of external factors 
such as weather-conditions, other vessels etc. In simulator exercises, the desired conditions 
are applied and adjusted in accordance with the wanted learning-outcome of the exercises. In 
real life situations, it can be necessary to wait a long period of time for the right conditions to 
appear. It can also be necessary to travel long distances to find the right conditions. 
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Repeatability is found to be significant when it comes to learning of procedures etc. In a 
simulator exercise, it is possible to repeat situations multiple times until both instructor and 
participants in the training is satisfied.  
Predictability is connected to the fact that it is possible to conduct the training without 
interruption from unwanted external factors. In real life, the training could be impeded by 
other vessels or a change in environmental conditions etc. In simulator training, all the focus 
can be pointed towards the factors that are connected to the learning-outcomes for the 
training. 
Learning from mistakes is a very useful way of learning, but not something that is wanted in a 
real-life situation. In simulator training, the participants can make mistakes which in real life 
could lead to massive consequences like grounding or collision.      
4.2 Simulator exercises 
To utilize the simulator training in the best possible way, it is necessary to make sure that the 
quality of the simulator exercises is high. In order to ensure that the quality of the exercises is 
of an adequate standard, it can be useful to determine some requirements to be followed when 
preparing the exercises. When preparing exercises for use in the maritime education at UiT, 
the responsible simulator-instructor has to develop the exercises in accordance with standards 
from the STCW-convention (International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers). It is possible to use some of these requirements as a basis 
also when developing other types of simulator exercises not primarily meant for education of 
nautical students. Some of the key factors that can be considered when developing exercises 
are (UiT, 2014): 
• Often, it is necessary to use several exercises with increasing level of complexity to 
successfully simulate a given situation. If this is the case, a plan should be developed 
that ensures that the exercises are progressing in accordance with the predefined 
goals for the simulation of the situation.  
 
• Learning objectives should be developed for each exercise. The participants in the 





• In the program at UiT, a predefined layout is used for description of the exercises. 
This can be used also for the polar exercises. This template should include title, area, 
description of scenario and learning outcome. 
 
• There should be a briefing prior to the simulator exercise. On the briefing, the 
scenario for the exercise should be discussed in detail, alongside with the learning 
outcomes. When the exercise is finished there should be a debriefing where the 
participants in the exercise is given feedback on their performance. If the exercise 
consists of teamwork between the participants, it is often useful if the participants 

















5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Preliminary hazard analysis is a technique to identify possible hazards for a system or a 
process. The principle for the analysis is to identify hazards that could lead to accidents. The 
aim is to find eventual weaknesses for the system or process before they occur, and then 
implement corrective measures as a proactive risk management. 
5.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis for navigation in polar areas 
The polar code requires that the vessel identifies all hazards that can be a threat for the vessel, 
crew and cargo. This can be done through the use of a preliminary hazard analysis. The first 
step in the preliminary hazard analysis is to reveal all relevant hazards that can be a threat to 
the vessel. In this thesis this is done through the use of literature, statistical data, and through 
information gathered through conversation with navigators with experience from operations 
under polar operating conditions.  
The next step in the analysis would be to identify the underlying causes for the hazards, and 
what possible consequences the hazards represents. From the information gathered through 
this process, a probability and a consequence for each hazard is derived. One of the main 
challenges when performing a preliminary hazard analysis is to quantify the probability and 
consequence based on the available information. In this analysis, the probability is given a 
value from 1 to 5, where 1 means very low probability and 5 means very high probability. 
The possible consequence is given a value from A to E, where A is minimal consequence and 
E is very high consequence. The correlation between probability and consequence is shown in 
table 3 below.  
For determination of risk acceptance criteria, the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Possible)-
principle is used. For this particular analysis, this means that risk in the red area is 
unacceptable, risk in the yellow area can be accepted under certain conditions, and risk in the 


















5-Very high      
4-High      
3-Medium      
2-Low      
1-Very low      
 
The preliminary hazard analysis is presented in table 4. Comments to the different parts of the 
analysis is presented in chapter 5.2. 
Table  4 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Hazard 
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5.2 Comments to the Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
To do a preliminary hazard analysis is a challenging task when the background data for 
determination of consequence and probability is limited. In this chapter, the different parts of 
the analysis will be briefly discussed, and the background for the determination of risk levels 
for each hazard will be explained. The risk for hazard 3.1, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 is set to yellow 
after risk reducing measures, but can still be accepted. This is due to the fact that further 
reduction is difficult to achieve, and the effectiveness of further risk-reducing measures is 
uncertain. All these hazards are connected to human errors, which is the most complex type of 
errors to prevent. Companies put a lot of effort and money into reducing the amount of human 
errors, but still it is the main reason for accidents. Based on the possible consequences of an 
accident, it is necessary for each vessel to determine if risk in the yellow area can be accepted.  
5.2.1 Icing on HULL (1.1) 
Icing on hull is a situation that all vessels operating in arctic climatic conditions will 
experience from time to time. In most cases, the icing is not severe and represents mostly a 
practical obstacle for the crew working on deck. It will also have a negative economic effect 
as the vessel will have increased displacement and therefore use more fuel to sail the same 
distance during a specified period of time. Alternatively, the vessel will have to reduce speed, 
and thereby use longer time, which means a loss of income for the company. This is 
important factors to consider for the company, but it is not the reason why the risk is set to 
medium for this hazard. The risk is connected to the few cases where the vessel will 
experience severe icing which will strongly affect the stability, freeboard and manoeuvrability 
for the vessel. This is a very serious situation that can be an immediate threat to the vessel and 
its crew. The history shows examples of several vessels that is lost due to icing, but it is worth 
mentioning that the vessels lost due to icing mainly is of a relatively small size. Nevertheless, 
icing can be a problem also for larger vessels, e.g. the Norwegian Coast Guard Vessel KV 
Nordkapp in the Barents Sea in 1987, described in an article written at UiT (Samuelsen, 
Løset, & Edvardsen, 2015). 
The risk-reducing measures can consist of installing heating arrangements that can either be 
proactive with heating up the hull and thereby prevent icing, or passive systems that are 
turned on if icing should occur. Routines and equipment for manual removing ice is also a 
measure that reduces the risk significantly.  
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5.2.2 Difficulty to keep the vessel on course (1.2) 
If the external forces affecting the vessel gets larger than the forces created by the vessels 
machinery and steering equipment, the vessel will have trouble steering the intended course. 
These external forces are typically generated by wind, waves or current. This can be a critical 
situation, where the vessel can be put in danger as the navigators will lose control of the 
movement of the vessel. The key to avoiding this situation is proper planning of the voyage 
and knowledge regarding the operational limitations for the vessel, in addition to knowledge 
regarding how the vessel reacts when affected by external forces. This knowledge can be 
gathered through training of the personnel, either in real life or in simulator. Simulator 
training is a helpful aid in gaining this knowledge, as each of the external forces can be 
applied individually, and thereafter as a complex situation with multiple forces applied at the 
same time. This type of training is difficult to achieve in real life, as the vessel can operate for 
long periods of time without these situations occurring. 
5.2.3 Reduced visibility (1.3) 
Reduced visibility is a problem that very often occurs in polar waters. One factor that can lead 
to this problem is marine or meteorological icing on windows. This can be avoided by 
installing windows with built-in hot-wires which prevents icing. Reduced visibility as a result 
of rain, snow or fog is a more complex factor to avoid, but the vessel and its crew has several 
methods for safe navigation by the use of other means than the optical when the visibility is 
reduced. If these means are used correctly, and the right means are used in the right situations, 
the risk is dramatically reduced. Operation in reduced visibility is well suited for simulator 
training, as the level of visibility can be adjusted to the intended learning-outcome of the 
simulator exercises. It is also possible to make different equipment available in different 
situations so that the navigators can learn to use different equipment and means under 
changing circumstances. If the aim is to the train the navigators in planning according to 
available weather information, it is possible to provide them with updated maritime safety 
information by the use of both VHF and NAVTEX. 
5.2.4 Loss of GNSS-position (2.1) 
Loss of GNSS-position is a situation all vessels should be prepared for although it happens 
very rarely. Total loss of GNSS-position is most often related to total blackout for GNSS-
receiver, either by failure for the receiver itself or by total blackout for the whole vessel. In 
the latter situation the emergency power supply for the vessel should be activated, and the 
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position will be available after a short period of time. The GNSS-position is the main source 
for positioning of the vessel, although the vessel can be manually positioned by using 
different types of manual positioning methods. This is more problematically in polar areas 
due to the lack of maritime infrastructure such as lights and other navigational marks. This 
means that loss of GNSS-position will have a bigger consequence in polar areas than in other 
areas with more infrastructure. The risk can be reduced by the use of redundancy, meaning 
instalment of more than one receiver, and by using different GNSS-systems. It is worth 
mentioning that for example GPS originally is an American military system that can be 
completely switched off if a politically crisis or war situation occurs. The probability of this 
happening is very low, and can be completely neglected by the use of more than one GNSS-
system. At the end, the main source for reducing the risk if a GNSS-blackout occurs is a well-
trained crew that knows how to react if the situation occurs. This can be practiced in simulator 
exercises where the GNSS-receiver can be turned off in different situations to assess how the 
crew reacts.    
5.2.5 Inaccuracy for GNSS-position (2.2) 
It is a fact that the inaccuracy for the position received from the GNSS-system will increase at 
higher latitudes. This is mainly due to the lack of satellites over the polar areas, which will 
lead to a poor satellite-geometry that will result in inaccuracy for the position. This problem 
has been reduced, and today it is possible to position the vessel with adequate accuracy even 
on the north pole. Today, the highest risk is connected to jamming and spoofing of the GNSS-
signals. In the northern part of Norway, jamming of the GPS-signal from the Russian military 
has led to difficulties for aircrafts over Finnmark. This can be the case in the northern areas 
also, as both the American, Russian and the Norwegian military is putting a lot of resources 
into techniques for manipulation of GNSS-signals. The risk of large inaccuracies for GNSS-
position can be significantly reduced by using more than one GNSS-system. This can easily 
be done by the use of a triple-receiver which lets the user take in signals from satellites that 
belongs to different GNSS-systems. The position will then be less vulnerable to manipulation 
of the signal from one of the GNSS-systems. The other factor that is significant for risk-
reduction is to have a well-trained crew that knows how to handle the situation if the GNSS-
position gets inaccurate. A well-trained crew will also detect changes and discrepancies for 
the position at an early stage, which is key to avoiding the situation from developing into a 
hazardous situation where the vessel and its crew are put in danger. 
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5.2.6 Freezing of GNSS-position (2.3) 
Freeze of GNSS-position is a situation that can occur if the receiver does not get signal from 
the satellites. This can mainly be induced by to types of failures, being internal failure for the 
GNSS-receiver or problems with the antenna. The main antenna-related problem in polar 
areas is icing. If the receiver is incapable of getting a signal from the antenna, then the 
position will freeze. This means that the GNSS-position will not change even though the 
vessel is moving. This will not give an alert in the ECDIS-system, since the system still will 
have GNSS-input. The key to detect this problem at an early stage is vigilant navigators that 
pays attention to the GNSS-receiver and the ECDIS-system. The problem can easily be 
detected on the ECDIS-screen, as the ownship-vector is depending on information from the 
GNSS-receiver. This means that no vector will be displayed if the GNSS-position is frozen 
even though the vessel has a speed in a given direction. 
5.2.7 Gyro failure (2.4) 
Failure for the gyro compass is a situation that very rarely occurs. The gyro-compass is 
maintenance-free, and is controlled during surveys of the vessel. IMO also has requirements 
regarding redundancy for gyro-compasses. The consequence of a gyro-failure can be 
significant, as the gyro-compass is the main source for heading information both directly to 
the navigators and to navigational systems such as the ECDIS. This consequence can be 
reduced by the use of redundancy from both multiple gyro-compasses and magnetic-compass. 
It is also important that the crew is familiar with the process of changing input sources to 
different navigational systems such as ECDIS and Radar/ARPA. This can be done through 
simulator exercises, where different sensors can be taken out, leading to the navigators having 
to choose which input to rely on, and then make sure this input is used for all relevant 
systems. If redundancy is implemented and the crew is well trained, the risk connected to 
gyro-failure can be set to an absolute minimum. 
5.2.8 Gyro inaccuracy (2.5) 
Gyro inaccuracy on high latitude is a well-known problem that will occur if the circumstances 
is right. This means that the probability of experiencing inaccuracy in gyro-course is very 
high when operating on high latitudes. If not compensated for, this will lead to wrong input to 
essential navigational systems such as ECDIS and autopilot. It will also provide the 
navigators with the wrong course, as the gyro-compass is the main source for heading-
information. The good news regarding gyro inaccuracy is that the error easily can be 
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compensated for, either manually by the use of formulas or tables, or the gyro-compass could 
have a built-in function that automatically compensates for the error. The inaccuracy can also 
be significantly reduced if more advanced gyro-compasses is used, e.g. fibre-optic gyro-
compass or ring-laser gyro. Another alternative is to use a GPS-compass, but then the risks 
connected to the GNSS-systems have to be considered. Independent of which technique that 
is used, it is important to have a competent crew that have knowledge in how to detect and 
quantify the inaccuracy, and then knows how to compensate for it. Then the possible 
consequence will be reduced to very low, and the risk can be set to low.  
5.2.9 Magnetic compass failure (2.6)  
Failure of the magnetic compass is something that very rarely occurs. The magnetic compass 
is a stand-alone system independent of external power-supply. The magnetic compass has no 
movable parts except from the compass-needle. This means that it very little chance of any 
mechanical failure for the magnetic compass. The only known source to failure except from 
mechanical failure to the compass-needle is freezing of the fluid in the compass-bowl. This 
will only occur if the fluid in the compass-bowl is replaced by water. The consequence of a 
magnetic compass failure is also very low, as the magnetic compass mainly is used as 
redundancy and therefore only has a standby-function at normal operation. Since both 
probability and consequence is set to very low, no risk reducing measures is necessary.     
5.2.10 Magnetic compass inaccuracy (2.7) 
The magnetic compass is an inaccurate instrument. It is mainly due to the large amount of 
inaccuracies for the magnetic compass that the gyrocompass is used as the prime source for 
heading information. The main factors affecting the magnetic compass is magnetic deviation 
and magnetic variation. These two factors will always be present, and they will not be 
constant, meaning that the compass will have to be calibrated with regular intervals. Between 
the calibrations the compass will become more and more inaccurate. Another factor that 
makes these errors challenging is that they vary both geographically/for different courses and 
over time. This means that even though the errors can be compensated for, both manually and 
automatically, the compensation factor will have to be adjusted after some time. The 
consequence of this inaccuracy is set to very low, as the magnetic compass mainly is used as 
redundancy and therefore only has a standby-function at normal operation. The total risk can 




5.2.11 Fatigue (3.1)   
Fatigue is a very common human-factor related problem in all industries, but it is extra 
common in the maritime industry due to the watch-rotation that can interrupt the circadian 
rhythm of the workers. In the Polar Region, the risk of experiencing fatigue increases as the 
vessel may operate in nearly total darkness 24-hours a day when operating in wintertime. In 
the summer, the opposite situation occurs with total daylight 24 hours a day, which can 
worsen sleep-problems. Most navigators have experienced fatigue, and it is a situation which 
can be serious, especially if the navigator is alone on watch and is unaware of the fact that 
he/she is experiencing fatigue. The risk of fatigue is difficult to reduce to a wanted level, but 
it is important to take action so the risk is as low as possible. Such actions could be working 
hours adjusted, or extra crew on watch. The best way to reduce the risk is to have a well-
trained crew, both physically and mentally. Through simulator exercises, the crew can 
develop techniques for detecting, and even better avoiding fatigue.  
5.2.12 Complacency (3.2)    
Navigating in the polar areas can be very challenging and exciting, but it can also be long and 
uneventful periods. Under such periods, it is quite easy for navigators to develop 
complacency. This can be very dangerous, as one of the key characteristics regarding polar 
conditions is how quickly they change. It is therefore of high interest to have vigilant and 
focused navigators that are able to detect hazards at an early stage. The most efficient way to 
reduce this risk is attitude forming of the personnel, in addition to making the working-day as 
productive as possible even though the level of action is low. 
5.2.13 Inadequate technical knowledge (3.3)     
When performing maritime operations under polar conditions, the crew often have to make 
use of special equipment which is rarely used in other operations, e.g. ice-radar. This means 
that the navigators may be unfamiliar with the use of the equipment which can lead to 
increased response time and, in a worst-case scenario, wrong use of the equipment that results 
in a grounding/collision. As always, training of personnel is a key factor to reduce the risk. By 
the use of simulator training, navigators can familiarize themselves with advanced equipment 
and systems, and be instantly ready to use them when required in real-life. In addition to 
training, the use of checklists and standard procedures will help the navigators to remember 
what to do in stressful situations. If these risk-reducing measures is implemented, the risk of 
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accidents connected to inadequate technical knowledge of equipment and systems can be set 
to very low. 
5.2.14 Poor equipment design (3.4)  
Poor equipment design has been a contributing factor in many accidents in maritime 
operations. When considering maritime operations in the arctic, it is mainly two types of 
errors that is connected to poor equipment design. The most common is light-pollution, either 
from equipment installed by the shipyard under the building-process or from equipment 
installed by the crew afterwards, e.g. coffee-makers etc. The other common type of poor 
equipment design is that vital equipment is placed in unsuitable places. Some equipment, such 
as the ice-radar, are for some vessels very rarely in use. It is therefore possible that this 
equipment is given a lower priority when it is installed. The problem is that when the 
equipment is needed, it is often used together with other navigational equipment, which was 
given a higher priority under the installation. This can lead to misunderstandings and 
miscommunication which can lead to grounding/collision. This risk can be eliminated if the 
users are included in the building process at an early stage, as they have the best knowledge 
when it comes to how the bridge-environment should be. If the equipment already is installed, 
the best way to reduce the risk is to train the personnel so that they can compensate for the 
eventual limitations induced by placement and installation of equipment. If these actions are 
taken it is possible to reduce the risk to very low.  
5.2.15 Decisions based on inadequate information (3.5)   
It is a common source of error that personnel make decisions based on information from 
sources they are familiar with, without making sure that the information actually is correct. 
These types of error is connected to complacency, if something looks correct it is no need to 
make sure that the information is correct, if something worked last time it will probably work 
this time and so on. It is difficult to reduce this risk, but with the use of attitude forming and 
checklists to make sure that all relevant information is considered, it can be reduced to an 
acceptable level. 
5.2.16 Poor judgement (3.6)  
Just like decisions based on inadequate information, poor judgement is a human error that is 
very difficult to prevent. It will happen from time to time regardless of how competent and 
skilled the crew is. Poor judgement is strongly connected to other kinds of human errors such 
as fatigue and complacency. If risk-reducing measures is implemented in connection to these 
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kind of human errors, it will have an effect also on the risk of accidents caused by poor 
judgement. Other factors that can result in poor judgement is lack of information and lack of 
experience. The latter is possible to prevent by implementing simulator training before taking 
part in real life operations. 
5.2.17 Faulty standards, policies and/or practices (3.7)   
Operation in polar areas demands extra equipment, extra training and extra competency. This 
leads to extra expenses. This is a problem in a market where the economic situation is 
challenging and the “profit first-thinking” is normal. Regulations from the authorities has 
made it difficult for the companies to operate in an unsafe manner, but it is nevertheless a fact 
that some companies are willing to take risks to gain a higher profit. This risk can only be 
reduced by attitude forming which have to start on the top and be implemented through the 
companies down to each crewmember on each vessel. If this task is taken seriously, and 





6 Simulation of polar operating conditions 
The main aim for this thesis is to identify how simulator exercises can be used for assessing 
and analysing situations and factors that can be a hazard to the vessel. It is preferable to assess 
situations in a simulated environment as a first step in a total risk assessment. It is possible to 
simulate situations that would be impossible to construct in real life due to safety and 
economic factors. In order to use simulator exercises in an efficient way it is necessary to 
make sure that the simulated situations are comparable to the real-life situation that the 
exercise is trying to analyse. In this chapter the simulation of different situations that could 
lead to hazards for the vessel is discussed, and in the end different means for improving the 
simulation of polar operational conditions is suggested.  
6.1 K-sim Navigation 
When discussing simulation of polar conditions in this thesis, it is related to simulation by 
using the K-sim platform from Kongsberg Maritime. This is mainly due to that it this is the 
available tool for simulation at UiT. Everyone involved with the simulation chapter of this 
thesis have experience with the K-sim platform, and is thereby able to make use of the 
different features available for the platform. Simulation of polar operating conditions can be 
achieved through other suppliers than Kongsberg, but it is safe to say that Kongsberg is one of 
the leading actors in the market for simulation of maritime operations. K-sim Navigation is 
also a new platform that has replaced the earlier K-sim Polaris. K-sim Navigation uses a new 
advanced physical engine along with state-of-the-art hydrodynamic modelling that allows 
vessels, objects and equipment to behave and interact as in real life (Kongsberg Maritime, 
2018). This is important for simulation of vessel movement in ice. In addition, Kongsberg 
states that “Vessels and objects including various geographical training areas and all possible 
weather conditions are brought to life with a sophisticated new visual system.” (Kongsberg 
Maritime, 2018). This is key to simulating operational conditions which is as realistic as 
possible.   
6.2 Failures and inaccuracy for equipment 
Failures and inaccuracy for vital navigational equipment is a vital challenge for navigation 
under polar operating conditions. Equipment that are normally seen as nearly maintenance-
free and almost always reliable, such as Gyro-compasses and GPS can be strongly influenced 
by polar conditions. In this chapter, some of the main operational limitations for vital 
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navigational equipment will be discussed, and how it can be simulated for preparation and 
development of risk-reducing measures for operation in polar areas. 
6.2.1 GPS 
Today, GPS and other satellite-based positioning system is the main source for determination 
of the vessels position. The focus will be pointed towards GPS, as this is the only possible 
satellite-based positioning system available for simulation on the K-Sim-platform. Other 
systems, such as GLONASS, GALILEO and BEIDOU will have the same challenges and 
limitations under polar conditions although having differences in the structure of the systems. 
For GPS, it is mainly two different kind of challenges related to operation under polar 
conditions. The first and most common is reduced accuracy due to bad satellite-geometry. 
This can be simulated as an offset for the available GPS-position. It is also possible to 
simulate offset in position for the differential positioning system. These kind of errors can be 
difficult to detect for the users, as the availability of other measures for positioning is limited. 
It can therefore be of interest to assess if navigators detect this kind of errors, and how they 
respond in order to compensate for the inaccuracy.  
The other challenge that can occur is loss of GPS-position due to icing on the GPS-antenna. 
This can be simulated through failure for the GPS-receiver, and the user will then be alarmed 
that no position is available. This error is less common, as heating of antennas is a 
requirement in the Polar Code. In addition, antennas are often being placed under sheltered 
conditions.  
To summarize, the different available failure modes regarding GPS for the K-Sim simulating 
tool are presented: 
• Failure for the differential positioning system, DGPS. This will lead to a decrease in 
positioning accuracy if the corrections from the differential system is reliable 
• Failure of the WAAS-system (Wide Area Augmentation System). WAAS is a satellite 
based differential positioning system that increases the positioning accuracy for the 
GPS-system. 
• “Freeze-failure”, where the GPS-position freezes. 
• “Defect-failure”, where the GPS-receiver is defect and no GPS-position is made 
available for the user.  
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All the failures mention above are incidents that occur from time to time, and can be 
challenging for the navigational officers to detect and manage. However, the failures are not 
especially related to operation under polar conditions. DGPS, for instance, is rarely available 
in the polar region, and the risk of the GPS freezing is not higher under polar conditions than 
under normal operations. Icing on the antenna can lead to lack of available GPS-position, 
which can be simulated through the use of the “Defect-function” in the K-Sim platform.  
The most interesting failure modes from a polar point of view is the possibility of simulating 
inaccuracy for the GPS-position presented to the user. This is done through manipulation of 
the latitude and/or longitude values. The different manipulation methods are presented below: 
• Fixed failure, meaning that the latitude/longitude is locked to a certain value. 
• Oscillating error, inducing an error in position that varies with time. Input values for 
this error are amplitude and period. 
• Offset error, inducing an offset for the latitude/longitude value. 
• Drift error, inducing an error in position that increases with time until a certain limit. 
The limit is set by the instructor. 
• Noise error, inducing noise that interferes with the GPS-signal. Can be used to 
simulate electromagnetic radiation. 
• Manipulation of dead band and hysteresis width. Will not be discussed further due to 
low significance for the situations analysed in this thesis.  
6.2.2 Gyro Compass 
Gyro-compass is the main source for determination of vessel course. Failure and/or 
inaccuracy in gyro-course is therefore a significant challenge when navigating the vessel. The 
available failure modes for the gyro-compass are listed below: 
• Oscillating error, inducing an error in heading that varies with time. Input values for 
this error are amplitude and period. 
• Offset error, inducing an offset for the heading displayed to the user. 
• Drift error, inducing an error in heading that varies with time until a certain limit.  
• Noise error, inducing noise that interferes with the gyro-heading. This leads to a 
disturbance in the heading displayed for the user and for the systems using the gyro-
heading as input, such as ECDIS. 
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In addition to these failure modes, the K-sim platform includes an option called “Gyro 
correction”. This option makes it possible to automatically compensate for different kind of 
errors, e.g. the speed-/latitude-error mentioned in chapter 2.1.2. 
6.2.3 . Magnetic compass 
Magnetic compass is mainly used as redundancy for heading information. The magnetic 
compass has two types of errors, magnetic variation and magnetic deviation. The available 
failure modes for the magnetic-compass is listed below: 
• Magnetic variation, measured in degrees. 
• Magnetic deviation, measured in degrees. Input values are degrees and heading (N, E, 
S, W) 
6.3 Climatic Conditions 
It is possible to simulate various kinds of climatic conditions on the K-sim platform. In this 
chapter, the available modes for simulation of different climatic conditions, such as weather 
and ice conditions, are discussed. 
6.3.1 Simulation of weather conditions 
Simulation of different weather conditions is important for making simulator exercises that 
are as close to real-life situations as possible. The K-sim platform offers various settings for 
simulation of weather conditions. A summary is given below: 
• A very important factor for simulation of weather conditions is the possibility for 
simulation of wind. This can be done directly by inserting values for direction, given 
in degrees, and speed, given in knots. It is also possible to implement an automatic 
change in wind conditions over a given time. If special wind conditions are wanted for 
a specific area, it is possible to establish a local wind polygon, where the applied wind 
conditions only will be present inside the polygon. If a special type of variation in 
wind conditions is wanted, the K-sim platform also offers the possibility of using 
wind-spectrums in the exercises. As a special feature regarding wind conditions, it is 
also possible to simulate gusts. It is then necessary to insert values for direction and 
speed also for the gusts. When discussing air conditions, it is also possible to adjust 




• Another factor that needs to be considered when creating simulator exercises is the 
properties for the sea. The most interesting factor to simulate regarding this matter is 
current, which can be simulated by inserting values for direction, in degrees, and 
speed, in knots. As for air, it is possible to adjust the temperature for the seawater. It is 
also possible to change the colour of the sea. As for the wind conditions, it is possible 
to simulate current for a specified area by the use of a local current polygon. 
 
• Probably the most important factor for simulation of weather conditions is the 
possibility to simulate waves. This can be done in three ways. The first choice is by 
using the “Auto” function, where the program itself simulates a realistic wave-
condition that is connected to the simulated wind situation. The other possibility is to 
use the “Wind waves and swell” function. This gives the user the possibility to adjust 
the wave-conditions as wanted. The wind generated waves is connected to the chosen 
wind-conditions, but it is possible to adjust the age of the waves, meaning for how 
long the waves has had to build up energy. The age is given in percentage between 0-
100%. For swells it is possible to adjust height in meters and direction in degrees in 
addition to age. The last possible choice for simulation of a wave-condition is to use a 
wave-spectrum. As for wind and current, it is possible to create a local wave polygon 
for simulation of waves for a specified area. 
 
• The last important factor for simulation of weather conditions is the possibility of 
simulation of precipitation. This is important since it affects the visibility, which is 
one of the key challenges for navigators. Precipitation is dependent of clouds, and for 
the K-sim platform, four different types of clouds is available for simulation. This is 
nimbostratus, altostratus, cirrus and cirrostratus. It is also possible to adjust the cloud 
density, which is given in percentage from 0-100%. The possible versions of 
precipitation are rain, hail, fog and snow, all given in percentage from 0-100%. It is 
possible to create local polygons for each type of precipitation if it is wanted for a 
specified area.    
6.3.2 Simulation of ice conditions 
The K-sim platform has a various amount of available ice conditions for simulation of 
different operations. The simulation of ice has mainly two features, a visual element and a 
physical element that affects the movement of the vessel. The different types of ice available 
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for simulation is shown below, with print screens from the K-sim Navigation simulator 
showing the visual view and the radar image for each ice-condition.  
 
• Sludge ice, which is ice that is not yet frozen to solid ice, but is in an early stage of 
freezing. Sludge ice is like a viscous fluid, but it is usually not more than 30 cm thick. 
It does not affect the movement of the vessel much, although it can freeze to solid ice 
over a short period of time. This can lead to the vessel getting stuck. Voyage through 
sludge ice can be very useful as a simulator exercise as it is a situation that most 
vessels operating in polar areas can be exposed to. Heavier ice conditions are most 
relevant for ice breakers and convoy-operations.  Visual scene and radar-image for 
sludge ice are shown in figure 7 and figure 8. 
 
 





Figure 8 Radar image Sludge ice 
 
• Pancake ice, which is circular pieces of ice with diameter from 30 cm to 3 m. The 
thickness is up to 10 cm. Visual scene and radar-image for pancake ice are shown in 





Figure 9 Pancake ice, concentration 5/10, thickness 0.1m 
 
 




• Solid one-year ice, which is solid ice from the current season. The thickness vary from 
0.3 m to 2 m. This is the ice-conditions which most vessels want to avoid without 
icebreaker assistance. Visual scene and radar-image for solid one-year ice are shown 
in figure 11 and figure 12. 
 
 




Figure 12 Radar image Solid one-year ice 
• Solid multiyear ice, which is solid ice that have survived multiple seasons. It is harder 
than one-year ice due to the fact that it contains less brine than first-year ice. Voyage 
in multiyear ice is preferably avoided, even for icebreakers. Visual scene and radar-










Figure 14 Radar image Solid multiyear ice 
 
• Hummocked ice, which is solid ice that is exposed to pressure and thereby are broken 
up and placed on top of each other. This forms an uneven surface that looks like 






Figure 15 Hummocked ice, concentration 8/10, medium average floe size, thickness 1.0m 
 
Figure 16 Radar image Hummocked ice 
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After the type of ice to simulate is chosen, it is possible to adjust the ice-conditions by the use 
of four parameters: 
 
• Concentration described by a value from 1-10, where 1 is very low concentration of 
ice and 10 is very high. This parameter is only available for pancake-, sludge- and 
hummocked-ice. For solid ice, it is not possible to adjust the concentration, as the 
concentration is a measure of the amount of ice in open water.  
 
• Average floe size described by the use of small/medium/large floe size.  
 
• Thickness, measured in meters. 
 
• Compression speed, measured in meters per hour.  
 
By the use of these available modes for simulation of ice, it is possible to simulate a generic 
ice condition that varies with time and position. The visual aspect of the simulation is quite 
good, it is possible to detect different ice-conditions only by the use of visual means. If the 
simulated environment is modelled in accordance with an ice-chart that is made available for 
the navigators, it is possible to train both on the preliminary planning before a voyage in ice, 
and thereafter execute the planned voyage.  
 
The K-sim platform has one main disadvantage related to simulation of ice, and that is the 
radar-image for detection of and navigation in ice. It is difficult to categorize which type of 
ice that is present by the use of radar. There is also no available application on the K-sim 
platform at this time which can simulate the use of ice-radar. This can be solved by the use of 
video from rea life ice-radars. The exercise can then be created in accordance with the video 
from the ice-radar. To collect ice-radar video for different situations and ice-conditions is a 
time-consuming process, not to mention the process of fitting the simulator exercises to the 
video footage. As a result of this, it is necessary to build-up the simulator exercises in such a 





In addition to the ice-conditions mentioned above, it is also possible to simulate icebergs. 
Icebergs is one of the most dangerous obstacles a navigator can run into. Icebergs can be very 
difficult to detect, as only 10% of the icebergs are visible above the sea-surface. it can also be 
difficult to determine the extension of the part of the iceberg under the sea-surface, meaning it 
is a risk of collision with the iceberg even with a long passing distance to the visible part of 
the iceberg.  
 
For the K-sim platform, three types of icebergs are available. The icebergs are modelled as 
targets, meaning that it is not possible to adjust the properties for the icebergs, as opposed to 
the sea ice. The types of icebergs available for selection when creating an exercise: 
 
• Iceberg 12, which is a large sized iceberg with a weight of 400000 tonnes. The length 
is 110 meters and the width is 61,20 meters. 
 
• Iceberg 13, which is a medium sized iceberg with a weight of 36000 tonnes. The 
length is 30 meters and the width is 20 meters. 
 
• Iceberg 14, which is a small sized iceberg. Both the length and the width are 3 meters. 
This type of iceberg can be used to simulate so-called growlers, which can be a very 
dangerous threat to a vessel as it can be extremely difficult to detect and yet have a 
large potential of damage.  
 
For ice-breaking operations, the K-sim platform has two extra features for adjustments of the 
ice-conditions, so called ice breaking factors. These are “crushing factor” and “friction 
factor”. This adjust the properties for the ice that is to be broken. This is a special feature that 
will not be discussed in detail.   
 
How the vessel movement is affected by the ice is not discussed further in this thesis, as this 
is strongly dependent of the vessel characteristics. This thesis is not related to operations for a 
specified vessel or type of vessel. Assessment on how the ice affects vessel movement has to 
be done in cooperation with a navigator with thorough knowledge of the vessel being 




6.4 Feedback from experts regarding simulation of ice-
conditions 
To support the findings collected during the testing of the ice-conditions, feedback regarding 
the simulation of ice-conditions were collected during a Polar Code certification-course at 
UiT in week 22. The participants on this course were Norwegian pilots who are piloting in the 
waters around Svalbard. The pilots participated in a standard simulator exercise for 
certification courses for the Polar Code at UiT. The exercise included several different types 
of ice including icebergs. After the simulation exercise, two of the pilots shared their thoughts 
regarding the simulation of ice. Their opinions are: 
• In general, the simulated environment is realistic and close to the real life scenario. 
• The visual factor is good, but in real life it is easier to assess the thickness of the ice. 
In the simulator exercise, it was difficult to detect which ice that was too thick to pass 
through. 
• The radar-image is not so indistinct compared to a real life radar. It can nevertheless 
not be compared to an ice-radar. 
• For training of personnel that are intended to operate in the waters around Svalbard, it 
will be very useful to participate in a simulator exercise with sludge ice with elements 
of small icebergs and growlers, as these are normal operating conditions around 
Svalbard. 
• The use of simulator exercises can absolutely reduce risk compared to having 
unexperienced personnel training in real life situations.   
The abovementioned factors is important to keep in mind when designing exercises for use as 
a risk-reducing measure. The eventual weaknesses for the simulated environment can to some 





7 Conclusions and suggestions for further work 
The preliminary hazard analysis performed in chapter 4 shows that simulator training can 
contribute in reducing the risk for most of the hazards that is found to be a threat in polar 
operating conditions. Especially when it comes to human error, which is the main source of 
error in the maritime industry, simulator training is found to be one of few effective ways in 
reducing risk. For more technical types of errors, such as equipment failure, simulator training 
is found to be useful, but then as an addition to conventional risk reducing measures such as 
duplication of equipment, regular maintenance etc.  
It is unquestionable that operation of vessels in the polar area is connected with high risk due 
to increased possibility for accidents to happen and increased consequences due to lack of 
infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions. A vessel operating in these areas without 
preparation and adjustments for such operations is not only breaking the law. It is also 
operating under a risk level that exposes the vessel and crew for immediate danger that can 
result in loss of lives and materialistic values. The preliminary risk analysis shows that the 
risk can be reduced to an acceptable level if mitigation measures is implemented.  
Now, the next step would be to develop simulator exercises that can be used as a risk-
reducing measure before operation in polar areas. These exercises would have to be assessed 
by experts on the field that has experience with operations under such conditions to make the 
simulated environment as close to real life as possible. It may then be necessary to adjust the 
preliminary hazard analysis, as some of the simulated situations may not have the intended 
effect on the risk. The preliminary hazard analysis would however be a useful tool for 
development of the initial simulator exercises. 
Regarding the technical part of the simulation, the main finding when trying out the different 
features regarding simulation of polar operating conditions is that K-sim platform experiences 
some problems when it comes to simulation of radar-image in ice. It would therefore be 
interesting to investigate if it is possible to implement real-life radar images as a part of the 
simulator exercises. This is something that has to be considered when developing the 
simulator exercises.  
Otherwise, the K-sim platform is found to be realistic when it comes to ice, especially the 
visual part. This is further strengthened by the feedback from the Norwegian pilots, who have 
experience from operations in polar waters. The level of realism is however something that 
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have to be assessed through the initial simulator exercises before it is possible to determine 
how close to reality the simulator exercises can be. The level of risk-reduction through 
simulator exercises is strongly dependent on the realism in the exercises. 
The main suggestions for further work: 
• Development of general simulator exercises to be used as a risk reducing measure for 
operation in polar areas. 
• Quality assurance of the exercises through feedback from experts on the field with 
experience from such conditions.   
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